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Abstract  
The aim of our paper is to analyze civil aviation relations between the United States of 
America and the European Union - constituting the most important intercontinental air 
transportation market in the world. Air transport between the EU and USA was 
traditionally regulated by bilateral Air Service Agreements of rather protectionist nature. 
The change came after Jimmy Carter had become the president of the USA and started 
pushing towards liberalization. After 1992, USA and some European states signed 
bilateral Open Skies treaties, representing an even higher level of liberalization than 
during Carter‟s era. However, the European Court of Justice declared these treaties 
unlawful in 2002. This decision led to a general EU-US Open Skies Agreement signed in 
2007. There have been ongoing negotiations on further liberalization; however their 
success is highly doubtful. 
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Introduction 
The United States of America and European Union are the most important air transport 
markets in the world and according to forecasts this situation will not change within the 
next twenty years.
1
 Both regions have been acting as drivers of air transport 
liberalization. Whereas the United States led deregulation efforts from 1970s until 1990s, 
in the beginning of the 21st century it is the EU who takes over liberalization initiatives. 
                                               
1 Airbus: Flying by Nature…, 2007. S. 47. 
The purpose of this paper is to research development of North Atlantic air transport 
liberalization from the end of World War II. until adoption of Open Skies Agreement in 
April 2007 and its entrance into force in 2008. 
 
1. International civil aviation 
Before proceeding to the genesis of North Atlantic air transport liberalization it is 
important to explain some of the basic principles of international civil aviation. Since the 
Chicago conference of 1944 international aviation relations have been governed by 
bilateral air service agreements (ASAs). ASAs contain a set of rules that regulate 
commercial aviation between signatory countries – they specify airports allowed to be 
flown to, they designate airlines, set capacity, frequency and pricing limits. To operate 
flights between 10 countries, a network of 55 bilateral ASAs is needed – every country 
has to sign an ASA with each country. Therefore there are several thousand ASAs in 
today‟s world, ranging from highly protectionist to completely liberal. The only fully 
functional multilateral ASA is the common aviation market of the European Union, 
including all the 27 member states of the Union. 
The most important factor in determining how liberal an ASA is, is market access. 
Market access is granted in terms of “freedoms of the air”. There are nine freedoms of the 
air. They are shown in the following table. 
 
Table 1: Freedoms of the Air 
Technical freedoms 
1
st
 freedom To overfly one country en-route to another country. B 
2
nd
 freedom To make a technical stop in another country. B 
Basic commercial freedoms 
3
rd
 freedom To carry PCM from the home country to another country. A-B 
4
th
 freedom To carry PCM to the home country from another country. B-A 
5
th
 freedom To carry PCM from the home country to another country, 
then continuing to a third country. 
A-B-C 
Derived freedoms and cabotage 
6
th
 freedom To carry PCM between two foreign countries with a stop 
in the home country. 
B-A-C 
7
th
 freedom To carry PCM between two foreign countries without a 
stop in the home country. 
B-C 
8
th
 freedom To carry PCM from the home country to another country, 
then continuing to another airport in the same country. 
A-B-B 
9
th
 freedom Cabotage. B-B 
A – home country, B a C – foreign countries; PCM – passengers, cargo and mail 
 
The first two freedoms of the air – also called “technical freedoms” – are included in all 
the ASAs and they constitute a right of an airline from the first country to overfly or to 
make a technical stop in another country. Freedoms three-five are “commercial 
freedoms”. They include a right to carry passengers from the home country to another 
country and back, and the right to carry passengers from the home country to another 
country with a stop in a third country. Freedoms six-eight are combinations of the first 
five freedoms. The ultimate freedom is called cabotage: it is a right of an air carrier to 
operate independent domestic flights in a foreign state. 
 
2. The origins of US-EU aviation relations 
In the decades following World War II. aviation relations between USA and western 
European countries were governed by traditional ASAs. The most important of them was 
the Bermuda I. agreement, signed between USA and United Kingdom in 1946. The 
agreement included multiple protectionist measures regarding designation of airlines, 
capacity and pricing limits. As a result of this agreement tariffs valid for international 
flights were set by the International Air Transport Association (IATA). It also included a 
list of gateway airports to be used in air transport services between USA and Great 
Britain, it introduced capacity sharing rules on a 50:50 basis and other protectionist 
measures. As an agreement between the two aviation superpowers of the era Bermuda I. 
soon became a template for ASAs everywhere in the world. In the 1970s there were 
approx. 1600 Bermuda-type agreements.
2
 
An important breakthrough occurred in 1978 when the United States signed the first 
liberal “Open market” agreement with the Netherlands. This was a direct result of the US 
presidential election won by a liberal candidate Jimmy Carter. The change of US 
international aviation policy resulted from three main motives, as identified by Rigas 
Doganis:
3
 
 Consumerism – is a movement aiming to enhance the rights of buyers in dealings 
with sellers. Carter‟s election campaign was based on the promise to strengthen 
the position of buyers at the markets, which should lead to wider selection of 
                                               
2 BUTTON, K – TAYLOR, S.: International Air Transportation and Economic Development, 2000. P. 211. 
3 DOGANIS, R.: Flying off Course, 2007. P. 52. 
goods and lower prices. Applied to international air transport this means 
deregulation leading to more international destinations covered by US airlines and 
lower flight ticket prices. 
 Belief in the invisible hand of the market – as a liberal, Carter deregulated 
domestic air transport, financial markets, telecommunications and other sectors of 
US economy. Seeing that domestic liberalization has positive effects on national 
economy, he expected liberalization of international economic relations to bring 
even higher benefits. 
 Ambition to support US airlines – when Carter was elected president, the 
position of US airlines was poor – their share at the transatlantic market barely 
reached 40% and in some markets (the Netherlands-US, Scandinavia-US) it lied 
below 20%.
4
 Therefore, the main goal of Carter‟s liberalization efforts was to 
improve the position of US airlines. Carter‟s administration aimed to support the 
large national carriers whose place of business had been limited to the domestic 
market. These companies had a huge base of passengers and a potential of vast 
economies of scale when allowed to compete internationally. This proved to be a 
right strategy and after deregulation, numerous US airlines (Northwest, Delta, 
United and others) entered international markets. 
The United States followed the program of open market agreements from 1978 to 1991. 
After the 1978 agreement with the Netherlands it concluded liberal ASAs with Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg and other countries. Open market agreements revoke all capacity 
and frequency restrictions on transatlantic air transport between signatory countries. They 
also liberalize price-setting rules – tariffs are no longer set by IATA, but rather by 
individual airlines on a double-disapproval
5
 or country-of-origin basis. Charter traffic is 
fully liberalized as well. 
Comparing benefits open market agreements bring to signatory countries, we come to a 
conclusion that there is a small imbalance in terms of market access: whereas US airlines 
can offer flights to Europe from any airport in the USA, European airlines have access 
only to specified American airports. Moreover, there is the unlimited designation clause: 
                                               
4 DOGANIS, R.: Flying off Course, 2007. P. 52. 
5 The tariff set by an airline is examined by the governments of USA and the other country. The tariff is 
valid unless BOTH governments disapprove. 
Technically it is reciprocal. However, taking into account that in the 1970s and 1980s 
there were only few European countries with more than one long-range airline, the 
advantages of this clause were almost entirely on the US side. Thus, unlimited 
designation supported US airlines and led to the situation marked by higher efficiency of 
US airlines compared to their European counterparts, which lasted until the crisis in 
2000.
6
 Another controversial issue is the right of the 5
th
 freedom. Although it is 
reciprocal, it is of significance for US airlines only. It allows US airlines to operate 
transatlantic flights to a European country with connecting flights to other countries 
beyond (e.g. Asian destinations or other European countries). For European airlines this 
right makes no sense, as there are no destinations beyond USA. 
Generally speaking, open market agreements had a positive impact on transatlantic air 
transport. The number of passengers increased dynamically (for example between 1987 
and 1993 it rose by 47%, whereas the growth of domestic US market in the same period 
was only 6%)
7
 and the prices of flight tickets declined considerably. However, not all the 
European countries took part in the open market initiative. The United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Greece and some other countries decided to stay out. Paradoxically studies 
show that European airlines from countries with liberal ASAs with USA lost their market 
share in 1984-1990, while airlines from countries with protectionist ASAs gained market 
share.
8
 This can be explained with unlimited designation enabling fast growth of the 
second generation of US air carriers. On the other hand, airlines from the most liberal 
European countries had to invest heavily in research and development and come up with 
new ideas almost constantly in order to remain competitive with their US counterparts. 
This led to higher flexibility, better innovation capability and finally to their better market 
position today. We can mention Air France, Iberia, KLM or Lufthansa as examples, in 
contrast with bankrupt Alitalia or Olympic Airlines. 
                                               
6 R. Doganis analyzes why European governments allowed unlimited designation to be a part of their ASAs 
with USA. He comes to a conclusion that the only two US airlines operating transatlantic flights in the 
1970s (TWA and Pan American) were weak and completely unaggressive. Therefore European 
governments didn‟t see the unlimited designation clause as a threat to their own national carriers. They 
didn‟t expect the new generation of US airlines to take use of it and become the most competitive airlines 
in the world. 
DOGANIS, R: The Airline Business, 2006. P. 33. 
7 ROBYN, D. – REITZES, J. – MOSELLE, B.: Beyond Open Skies..., 2005. P. 53. 
8 BUTTON, K.: Toward Truly Open Skies, 2002. P. 15. 
 3. The “Open skies” era 
Open market agreements stopped short of full liberalization. They still contained some 
minor designation and pricing restrictions. Moreover, they didn‟t include provisions 
which would enable code-sharing between European and American airlines. Code-
sharing was still considered illegal under US law. 
In 1992 US government introduced an era of “Open skies” agreements. It was strongly 
supported by airlines like American, Delta or United who realized previous liberalization 
through open market agreements was the main factor behind their international success.  
In the late 1980s the US domestic market was close to saturation. To ensure further 
growth US airlines had to focus on international markets. Knowing their competitive 
advantage in liberal marketplace was higher than advantages of European airlines (thanks 
to the bigger size of internal market leading to lower unit costs), US air carriers and 
scientific community executed pressure on US Department of Transportation to 
accelerate liberalization. 
In 1992 the first open skies agreement was signed between USA and the Netherlands. 
Three years later 7 other EU-member states followed. 
The measures included in open skies agreements can be analyzed in four points:
9
 
 Free market competition – no restrictions on number of designated airlines, 
capacity, frequencies and types of aircraft. Unlimited fifth freedom rights. 
 Pricing determined by market forces – a fare can be disallowed only in specified 
circumstances and only if both governments concur (double disapproval). 
 Fair and equal opportunity to compete – all carriers of both countries may 
establish sales offices in the other country and can convert and remit earnings in 
hard currencies at any time. Airlines are free to provide their own ground 
handling services. User charges cannot be discriminatory. 
 Optional seventh-freedom all-cargo rights – provide authority for an airline of 
one country to operate all cargo-services between the other country and a third 
country, through flights that are not linked to its homeland.
10
 
                                               
9 MICCO, A. – SEREBRISKY, T.: Competition regimes and air transport costs..., 2006. P. 29. 
The following table compares typical open market and open skies agreements. 
 
Table 2: “Open market” and “Open skies” agreements 
 OPEN MARKET (1978-1991) OPEN SKIES (1992-2008) 
Market access Multiple designation 
 
US airlines: from any point in the US 
to specified pts. in foreign countries 
EU airlines: access limited to a 
number of US points 
Multiple designation 
 
Unlimited 
Freedoms of the air Extensive 5
th freedom rights Unlimited 5th freedom rights 
 
Optional cargo 7th freedom rights 
Capacity No frequency or capacity controls 
 
Break of gauge permitted in some 
agreements 
No frequency or capacity controls 
 
Break-of-gauge rights granted 
Tariffs Double disapproval or country of 
origin rules 
Free pricing 
Code-sharing Not part of bilateral Permitted 
Source: BUTTON, K. – DREXLER, J.: The Implications on Economic Performance in Europe of 
Further Liberalization..., 2006. P. 50. 
 
Probably the most important issue dealt with in open skies agreements is code-sharing. 
American antitrust laws have traditionally classified code-sharing as an inadmissible anti-
competitive practice. However, airlines from countries with a valid open skies agreement 
with USA may receive an exception. For many countries this was the crucial argument 
when considering joining the open skies wave. A good example might be found in 
Germany. German national carrier – Lufthansa wanted to code-share with United Airlines. 
In order to receive antitrust immunity, Lufthansa exercised strong pressure on German 
government that finally led to conclusion of open skies agreement in 1996. Other 
examples of successfully granted antitrust immunity include KLM-Northwest and SAS-
United. On the other hand, airlines from countries unwilling to enter into open skies 
arrangement with USA did not receive immunity (e.g. the proposed British Airways-
American Airlines alliance). 
Numerous studies have been conducted, analyzing impacts of open skies agreements on 
North Atlantic aviation. The US Government Accountability Office observes a rise in the 
number of transatlantic passengers from 28 Mio. in 1990 to 51 Mio. in 2000 and 
attributes a large part of the increase to liberalization.
11
 The Brattle report, elaborated on 
                                                                                                                                            
10 A model text of open skies agreements can be found at 
http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/othr/ata/114866.htm. 
11 US Government Accountability Office: Transatlantic Aviation..., 2004. P. 11. 
behalf of the European Commission, quantifies this impact at 10%.
12
 The main reason 
behind the increase was a birth of alliances enabled by easy access to antitrust 
immunity.
13
 US Department of Transportation conducted a study comparing trends in 
transatlantic flight ticket prices at liberalized markets with trends at more protectionist 
markets. It comes to a conclusion that between 1996 and 1999 the decrease in flight ticket 
prices reached 20.1% at open skies markets while it was only 10.3% at markets governed 
by more restrictive ASAs.
14
 Micco and Serebrinsky study impacts of open skies 
agreements on air transport costs and on international trade. According to their estimates 
air transport costs fell 9% in the first three years when open skies agreements were in 
effect, providing thus for a 7% increase in share of air transport at total cargo 
transportation.
15
 
Opponents of open skies agreements included chiefly weak, inefficient, predominantly 
government-owned airlines. These were afraid of not being able to compete with US 
airlines under the rules of free market. As a result of the opposition of their national 
airlines some EU-members decided to reject open skies offers and retain status quo in 
their aviation relations with USA. 
As demonstrated in the following table, out of 27 member states of the Union 11 didn‟t 
adopt an open skies agreement with USA by 2007, among them some of the most 
important aviation markets in Europe – Spain and United Kingdom. 
 
Table 3: Extent of Open skies coverage in 2007 
COVERED NOT COVERED 
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Sweden 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Spain, 
United Kingdom 
TOTAL: 16 TOTAL: 11 
Source: ALFORD, E. – CHAMPLEY, R.: The Impact of the 2007 U.S.-EU Open Skies Air 
Transport Agreement, 2007. P. 2. 
 
Probably the biggest setback was unwillingness of the UK to participate in open skies 
initiative. The US-UK market is by far the most important transatlantic air transport 
market and London-Heathrow is the busiest airport in the world by international 
                                               
12 Brattle Group: The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open Aviation Area, 2002. P. vi. 
13 STOBER, A.: Who Soars in Open Skies?, 2003. P. 125. 
14 US Department of Transportation: Transatlantic Deregulation – the Alliance Network Effect, 2000. P. 3. 
15 MICCO, A. – SEREBRISKY, T.: Competition regimes and air transport costs..., 2006. P. 27. 
passenger traffic. Since 1977 Anglo-American aviation relations were regulated by a 
restrictive ASA called Bermuda II. The agreement limited access to transatlantic traffic at 
Heathrow and Gatwick airports only to 4 airlines – 2 from each side of the Atlantic – 
British Airways, Virgin Atlantic, American Airlines and United Airlines. Furthermore, it 
contained a list of so-called gateway airports – the only American airports open for 
transatlantic service to Britain. Other measures included strict capacity and pricing limits 
and elimination of the 5
th
 freedom rights for US airlines. 
As Bermuda II. agreement was in direct contradiction with interests of US airlines, the 
US government made numerous attempts to renegotiate the conditions; however, only 
some partial changes were achieved. Thus, Anglo-American air transport market 
remained governed by highly restrictive rules until 2008, when a general US-EU Open 
Skies Agreement entered into force. 
We believe that although open skies agreements were advantageous for countries on both 
sides of the Atlantic, from a long-term perspective it was a smart strategy of US policy-
makers aiming to improve the position of US air carriers on transatlantic market. Some 
analysts call this strategy “divide and conquer.”16 The practice of negotiating separate 
agreements with EU-countries led to fragmentation of internal aviation market of the EU 
on the basis of nationality clauses. We can demonstrate this on the following example: in 
1995 USA signed open skies agreements with Finland, Austria and Belgium. Each of 
these agreements was a bilateral, granting traffic rights only to airlines of the two 
respective signatory countries. US airlines received a right to offer flights to any of the 
aforementioned countries. However, Finnair could only offer flights between USA and 
Finland, Austrian between USA and Austria and Sabena between USA and Belgium. 
European airlines didn‟t receive rights of the 7th freedom that would allow them to 
operate services between USA and a European country other than their home country. 
This led to fragmentation of the European internal aviation market. 
Another problem (exactly as with open market agreements) was granting of the 5
th
 
freedom rights to US airlines. According to our opinion, the best description of the 
situation was offered by a director of the DHL cargo company, R. Steisel: “The economic 
reality is that fifth freedom rights in Europe are more equivalent to giving US airlines 
                                               
16 ZHANG, A. – ZHANG, Y.: Issues on liberalization of air cargo services..., 2002. P. 279. 
cabotage rights, not just fifth freedom rights. For instance, FedEx, a US cargo carrier, can 
transport its shipments from Charles de Gaulle airport in France to Frankfurt on the route 
between the US-Charles de Gaulle-Frankfurt, whereas DHL or TNT as European carriers, 
could not transport cargo from New York to Los Angeles on the route Brussels/Liege-
New York-Los Angeles. This enables FedEx to organize its European distribution system 
from its European hub of Charles de Gaulle, whereas DHL and TNT are forced to 
subcontract their US airlines operations to a US carrier”.17 
The European Commission was well aware of the situation. Understanding the threat 
separate open skies agreements might constitute for internal market, it asked the Council 
for a right to negotiate a general EU-US bilateral open skies agreement. After all the 
requests were rejected (in 1990, 1992 and 1995), the Commission appealed to the 
European Court of Justice in 1998. 
 
4. The 2002 European Court of Justice judgments 
The Commission took legal action against seven EU members that had signed an open 
skies agreement with USA. There were two main arguments supporting the position of 
the EC: 
 the EC has exclusive rights to negotiate international air service agreements on 
behalf of the EU, because separate approach by member states would harm the 
competition; 
 nationality clauses contained in the open skies treaties violate the Community law, 
especially the right of establishment contained in art. 43 of the Treaty establishing 
the European Community
18
. 
On the same grounds the EC also took legal action against the UK and its restrictive 
Bermuda II. agreement. 
In November 2002 the European Court of Justice decided that by entering into open skies 
relations with USA “the Kingdom of Belgium [and the other states as well] has failed to 
fulfill its obligations under Article 5 of the EC Treaty (now Article 10 EC) and Article 52 
                                               
17 BUCHAN, D.: Open Skies and Deregulation – The Coming Revolution, 2003. P. 5. 
18 Art. 43: “…restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of 
another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibition shall also apply to restrictions on the setting-up 
of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of any 
Member State.” 
of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 43 EC).”19 Thus, the ECJ ruled that 
nationality clauses violated Community law. On the other hand, the ECJ played down the 
argument of the EC that it is the only entity entitled to negotiate air service agreements. 
The judgment of the ECJ was widely considered to be dichotomical – it contained two 
different aspects, each of them in favor of a different party. First, it confirmed that 
nationality clauses were illegal. This could possibly have wide implications on hundreds 
of ASAs signed by the member states, as almost all of them contained a nationality clause. 
However, the Court didn‟t authorize the Commission to renegotiate these ASAs. The 
dichotomy caused legislative uncertainty and in the weeks following the judgment it was 
almost impossible to predict any future steps. 
Seven months later, in June 2003 the Council authorized Commission to start 
negotiations with USA, with the aim to establish a transatlantic common aviation area. 
The most important milestones of these negotiations can be seen in the following table. 
 
Table 4: Countdown to Open skies 
DATE ACTION 
2002, 5th  November ECJ Open skies judgments. 
2003, 5th June Commission agrees authorization to open skies negotiations. 
2003, 1st October Negotiations begin. 
2004, 11th June The Council rejects the first draft of the agreement. 
2007, 2nd March Draft agreement initialed in Brussels. 
2007, 22nd March Agreement approved unanimously by the 27 EU transport ministers. 
2007, 30th April Agreement signed at EU-US summit in Washington D.C. 
2008, 30th March Agreement enters into force. 
Source: Oxera: Slots Trading under Open Skies, 2007 and multiple other sources. 
 
The first draft agreement, submitted in October 2004, was rejected by the Council on the 
grounds of falling behind expectations and being too disadvantageous for European 
airlines. After eleven rounds of negotiations the agreement was finally signed on April 
30
th
 2007 in Washington D.C. It entered into force on March 30
th
 2008. 
 
5. US-EU Open Skies Agreement 
The US-EU Open Skies Agreement, in force since March 30
th
 2008 includes the 
following most important measures:
20
 
                                               
19 Judgement of the Court 61988J0471 of 5th November 2002, case C-471/98. 
20 See HASAN, M.: Transatlantic Open Aviation Area…, 2008. P. 2. 
 all the US and EU airlines can operate flights between any point in the EU and 
any point in USA; 
 US accepts the Community air carrier concept i.e. airlines owned by nationals of 
any EU member state have the same rights and obligations; 
 no capacity or frequency limits on transatlantic flights; 
 free pricing; 
 unlimited code-sharing for both sides; 
 alliances between US and EU airlines qualify for antitrust immunity. 
Even a brief look at the provisions of the Treaty would allow us to claim it forms a huge 
step on the way toward full liberalization of the North Atlantic air transport market. 
However, there are some measures which make the Treaty more advantageous for USA 
than for the EU. One of the most important problems – as we have already mentioned in 
section 3 – is the 5th freedom issue. Although technically it is reciprocal, it is of no use 
for European carriers. Whereas US airlines can operate 5
th
 freedom services between two 
European countries, European carriers have no access to US internal market. What is 
more, European negotiators didn‟t succeed in their attempts to abolish Fly America 
program.
21
 In contrast to these setbacks for Europe, American negotiators achieved their 
primary objective – unrestricted access to Heathrow airport. 
Currently, negotiations on the second stage of open skies agreement are in progress. The 
main goals include unlimited access to US internal market and suspension of airline 
ownership barriers. Taking into account current global economic crisis and negative 
signals from the Obama administration, full liberalization of transatlantic aviation market 
remains utopia.  
 
Conclusion 
We believe the US-EU Open Skies Agreement can become a template for multilateral 
ASAs in other regions of the world. Similar projects can come into existence in South-
East Asia or Latin America. Another possibility is enlarging the US-EU agreement to 
include further countries, for example Canada. However, we do not expect global 
liberalization of air transport to come forward. Economic and national security interests 
                                               
21 Under Fly America Act only US airlines are eligible to carry government-funded traffic. 
of individual countries are stronger than a vision of collective benefits. It is one of the 
reasons the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) specifically excludes air 
transport from liberalization. Moreover, the GATS itself is highly controversial and has a 
wide range of opponents.
22
 Global economic crisis is another factor that hinders 
liberalization efforts. Therefore, it should be of no surprise when we claim that the 
implicitly set goal of the European Commission to liberalize global air transport will not 
be fulfilled within the next decade. 
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